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Following is the text of an NBC Network broadcast, the second in a group of State Department programs and the 45th in a larger series entitled OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

Subject: "A National Intelligence Program"

- Participants:
1. The Honorable William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
  2. Mr. Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of Research and Intelligence.
  3. Mr. Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air.

ANNOUNCER: Here are HEADLINES FROM WASHINGTON:

COLONEL McCORMACK of STATE DEPARTMENT OUTLINES PLAN FOR A UNIFIED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE; ADVOCATES A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY TO PLAN A GOVERNMENT-WIDE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND INSURE THAT IT WILL BE CARRIED OUT.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE BENTON SAYS AN ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR FOREIGN INFORMATION SERVICE; ADVOCATES MAKING A MAXIMUM OF INFORMATION ON OTHER COUNTRIES AVAILABLE TO AMERICAN PUBLIC.

This is the second of a new group of State Department broadcasts, presented by the NBC University of the Air as part of a larger series on OUR FOREIGN POLICY. This time Mr. William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, and Mr. Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of Research and Intelligence, will present the State Department's

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proposal

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proposal for a unified intelligence system. Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air, will be chairman of the discussion. Mr. Fisher --

FISHER: A good many of us, when we hear the word "intelligence", think of IQ's and mental tests. I think it would be well to start off, like Socrates, with a definition of the term. Do you want to try your hand at it, Mr. Benton?

BENTON: I think I ought to say first, Mr. Fisher, that my main interest in intelligence -- as we are using the word here -- is in its usefulness to my task of transmitting a maximum of information to the people, through education, through reports on foreign affairs, through building better understanding of ourselves and of other peoples. As we said last week, this is now a fundamental part of American foreign policy.

FISHER: It's really too bad the word "intelligence" has so many meanings. ...

BENTON: Of course, there are many interpretations of intelligence, depending on where you sit and what you're looking at. I'm sure Hitler never thought Roosevelt intelligent. We tend to think anyone who disagrees with us is unintelligent. But that's not the sense in which we're using the term here... This program is mainly Col. McCormack's program -- the Washington Colonel McCormack, not the Chicago one. During the war Colonel McCormack has been Director of Intelligence for the Military Intelligence Service of the War Department. Let's ask him for his definition of "intelligence".

MCCORMACK: Well, I might start off by saying what intelligence isn't -- it isn't primarily -- or even to any larger extent -- the "cloak and dagger" stuff that you read about in the spy books; at least peacetime intelligence is not of the "cloak and dagger" type.

FISHER: What

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FISHER: What do you mean by "cloak and dagger" type, Colonel McCormack?

MCCORMACK: I mean the sort of thing the OSS -- the Office of Strategic Services -- did in making contact with Marshal Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia -- or with the resistance movements of Burma and Siam.

FISHER: If you're going to start by describing what intelligence is not, Colonel, you might tell us a little about one of these cloak and dagger cases -- to show how wartime operations differ from peacetime intelligence.

MCCORMACK: The Yugoslav operation is a good example. In October 1943, Major Louis Huot of the OSS went to Bari, Italy, to establish a base. From there he went into Yugoslavia to make contact with Tito and arrange for a supply line into partisan territory. OSS located its supply base on the island of Vis off the Dalmatian coast, which the Partisans held. A regular shipping line was then extended to Vis, the ships travelling by night in the enemy-held waters. As many as 20 ships were en route at one time. From the coast, a fleet of heavy trucks carried supplies through territory heavily garrisoned by the Germans and into the hills, where the Partisans had their bases. During the winter of 1943-44 OSS shipped in to the Partisans about 19,000 rifles, 165,000 hand grenades, over 600 machine guns, and thousands of bales of shoes and clothing. Quite an operation ....

FISHER: Running guns is a good example, then, of what peacetime intelligence is not.

MCCORMACK: Exactly. Our hardest job is to overcome this romantic but false idea of what intelligence work is. The notion that it is all gun-running, espionage and sabotage is still very prevalent.

BENTON:

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BENTON: Of course, Colonel, some good intelligence came out of that Yugoslav operation. I remember hearing how the OSS brought back valuable information about the German mine fields, the Yugoslav battle order, the relative strength of the Partisans and the smaller army of General Mihailovic, and even about Marshal Tito and the members of his government ....

MCCORMACK: Yes, Mr. Benton, that was a good example of wartime intelligence work. But it is not the sort of intelligence work that you do in peacetime.

FISHER: But, Colonel McCormack, isn't the OSS -- the so-called cloak and dagger outfit -- the nucleus of the intelligence organization for which you are responsible in the State Department?

MCCORMACK: No, Mr. Fisher, the operations end of the OSS -- which during the war carried on secret intelligence, sabotage and that sort of thing -- has all gone over to the War Department, to be absorbed into normal peacetime work. What the State Department has taken over is the Research and Analysis organization -- the outfit whose business it is, you might say, to turn information into intelligence -- to take the mass of incoming material and get the truth out of it. That job, -- and I cannot emphasize this too strongly -- is the critical and vital phase of intelligence work. Incoming information is good, bad and indifferent, and it is useless unless it is pieced together, checked and re-checked, so that the bad and the indifferent information is weeded out.

FISHER: It seems to me that we have arrived at a rough description of what we mean by intelligence -- even if we got there by the back door, as it were.

MCCORMACK: I

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McCORMACK: I might put it this way: Foreign intelligence -- and we are talking only about foreign intelligence -- is the sum total of all information about foreign countries which is relevant to the policies and problems of the Government.

FISHER: Under that definition it would seem to me that intelligence covers the whole range of human knowledge.

McCORMACK: It does. It ranges from estimates, say, of the political intentions of a revolutionary party in some country to the most detailed kind of information, such as the depth of water at a particular point on a beach where conceivably military operations might some day occur.

FISHER: Mr. Benton, what would you add to that?

BENTON: I think, Mr. Fisher, we mean by intelligence -- foreign intelligence -- accurate, complete and timely information about foreign countries. Whenever you have a problem, you need information -- intelligence -- to help you arrive at the right answer. In fact, you need that kind of intelligence, and also intelligence of the ordinary garden variety -- common sense -- to help you use your information. The best intelligence in the world -- I'm talking about information now -- doesn't help a man who won't believe it, won't apply it, won't use his common sense. The British, back in the late 1930's, had one of the best intelligence systems in the world -- but I gather that their top policy-makers didn't use their intelligence about Germany. For that matter, I'm not sure that we have always used our intelligence to good advantage.

FISHER: Yes,

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FISHER: Yes, we must add common sense to intelligence, Mr. Benton; we can all agree on that. But can you give us some examples of the sort of peace-time intelligence we'll be needing?

BENTON: Well, take the international information service that the State Department will be operating abroad. You can't do a first-rate job of that without knowing what foreign peoples want to know and understand about us. What, for example, confuses and puzzles them about America? We want to project the image of America abroad. We want to explain American foreign policy and the basis for it. This will be a contribution to world peace, because peace is based on understanding. But we can't succeed unless we have a very good knowledge of the peoples to whom we are talking, and their attitudes.

McCORMACK: In other words, Bill, if you are going to broadcast to people, you must talk to them not only in their own language, but in terms they will understand. So you must know them.

BENTON: We must know them if we are to tell them about us. We can't address a vacuum. We must have a maximum flow of information coming in. And I believe the intelligence we get about foreign countries should be shared generally with members of the American public -- to help them understand other peoples.

FISHER: And for this we need intelligence about our closest allies as well as about other nations, Mr. Benton.

BENTON: Yes, Mr. Fisher; a good example of that is the proposed British loan. Our representatives in those negotiations were supplied with a thick handbook of facts -- intelligence -- about economic conditions in Great Britain,

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Great Britain, her resources, the effect of the war on her economy, the type of help she needed to get back on her feet, and what she could reasonably be expected to contribute to the bargain. When the negotiations began both the British and Americans were fully aware that the other party knew all economic factors involved. This was no poker game where any party could or had to maintain a bluff. Beginning with all the cards on the table, the negotiators were able to spend their entire efforts on coming to an agreement that would benefit both parties and the world at large.

FISHER: Mr. McCormack, what would you add to that?

McCORMACK: Well, I might state the objectives of our foreign intelligence -- why we need accurate and complete information about foreign countries. The first objective is to know and understand the other countries and peoples of the world well enough to live with them in peace -- to shape our policy, as it affects other peoples, toward the aims of peace. The second objective is to be prepared for war if it occurs.

BENTON: That's a mighty clear statement of our objectives, Al. I would like to point out one thing more: A great deal of the work that is done in gathering intelligence is prosaic, routine, day-to-day reading of newspapers, reports, radio broadcasts, technical journals, and so on. There's nothing very glamorous about this. But it's a basic part of a government's intelligence operation.

FISHER: That's where the professors come in, I suppose.

BENTON: There are some who make snide remarks about the "professors" in OSS and government departments. The fact is, they are among the ablest intelligence officers we have -- and in private life their research, their  
scholarly

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scholarly journals, and so on, are goldmines of information for anyone who will take the trouble to read them and try to understand what they are saying. It's necessary to accumulate such a backlog of information that when you need a fact, it's there -- you know where to find it. And 90 percent or more of intelligence is freely available to anyone who wants it. You can get it in libraries and bookshops and on newsstands, from individuals or from our accredited mission abroad. It's open intelligence.

FISHER: Do you agree on this point, Col. McCormack?

McCORMACK: Yes, most of the intelligence this government needs to carry on its peacetime foreign relations is available here and in other countries. It may take hard work to find it and put it together, but it is there, in sources that are open and above-board. We don't have to drop in a secret agent by parachute to get the business, trade, political and most of the other information we need.

BENTON: Other nations know that intelligence work is not as sinister as it sounds to some Americans. Other governments know that intelligence, quickly gathered and carefully analyzed, is the foundation for open and honest peacetime dealings. I believe that intelligence should be freely exchanged among nations. I hope other nations will have the sort of intelligence operations over here that will give them a real understanding of America. I'm not talking about military secrets here, of course, but about basic knowledge of America.

FISHER: There's one question that needs to be answered, though, Colonel McCormack. We had our intelligence agencies before the war. Didn't they serve their purpose pretty well?

McCORMACK: Well,



McCORMACK: Well, Mr. Fisher, it's true that we have vast resources in this Government and this nation for intelligence, but we were not making anything like full use of them before the war. For example: At least 80 percent of the information used in the air war against the Japanese homeland was physically within the United States when the war started. It was in the files of the Army, Navy, various branches of the Government -- in the files of banks, insurance companies, engineering and construction companies, business firms of all kinds, religious organizations, and even in the minds and private records of individuals. But to find all that information, put it together and make it mean something took about two and a half years. If we are threatened with war again, we are not likely to have two and one-half years for preparation of essential intelligence. We may not have even two and one-half months. Therefore, we propose to have our intelligence ready for any emergency.

FISHER: I'm sure all Americans will second that.

McCORMACK: I should add this: Our physical scientists, our social scientists -- our specialists and experts -- know a great deal about the physical world and the peoples of the world, but we do not know everything. When something new comes along, like the atomic bomb, new needs for intelligence arise. And on any subject that you want to name there is still a lot to be learned.

BENTON: I can illustrate that point. Not long ago a Government geographer made a map of the world's mineral resources, in terms of our knowledge of them. Where we were well-informed, he drew the area in black; where our information was only fair, he used dark gray; and where we had comparatively little information, light gray. And most of the surface of the earth was in light gray.

McCORMACK: And

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McCORMACK: And that's a pretty serious matter, Bill, when you consider the importance of the rare metals.

FISHER: Did our intelligence compare favorably with that of other countries during the war, Col. McCormack?

McCORMACK: Very favorably, I would say. We made our mistakes in intelligence, of course, just as in other fields. We were slow in getting started; but at the critical periods of the war our intelligence was good. On the whole, the intelligence of the Allies in Europe was considerably better than that of the Germans, and in the Pacific it was vastly superior to that of the Japanese. During the last year of the war we actually knew more about the Japanese than they knew about themselves, in such important matters as the dispositions and activities of their armed forces and their shipping, for example.

FISHER: Has the Pearl Harbor Investigation brought out any important lessons about intelligence?

McCORMACK: Well, it has given further support to one basic doctrine of the Army and Navy, namely, that in intelligence work the thing that you must worry about is not so much what you think the enemy is going to do, but what he might be capable of doing. You must prepare yourself against everything that he has the capacity to do, and not merely what you think he is going to do.

BENTON: What concerns me most is the need for more accurate and up-to-the-minute information on the things that people live by -- their cultural traditions and their current attitudes. That's not cloak-and-dagger stuff, and it may sound dull, but it's important to us -- not only in our broadcasting and information work, but for the State Department in formulating foreign policy.

FISHER: In other words, you can't have a sound policy without a sound basis for it.

BENTON: That's right -- and that includes accurate information about the peoples as well as the governments of other countries.

FISHER: Well,

FISHER: Well, gentlemen, you've certainly established the need for good intelligence. The key question, then, is how to get it -- how to improve our facilities for gathering information and channeling it to the people who need it. Colonel McCormack, I understand that you're in favor of a unified intelligence service,

McCORMACK: That, Mr. Fisher, is like saying you are for sunshine or mother love. Everybody is for unified intelligence. There are, however, a number of different views as to how to go about it.

FISHER: Do you support the proposal for one big intelligence agency, to take in all those now in the field?

McCORMACK: No, and I consider that proposal unrealistic, because the subject matter of intelligence is too varied and too complicated, and because intelligence work must be done where the decisions are made, and by those who are specialists in each field. No one would think of taking medical intelligence, for example, away from the Medical Corps and putting it in some big agency. Certainly the Army and Navy would not turn over military intelligence to a central agency. I have always thought that the proposal for one big intelligence organization, separated from the operating departments of the government, was like a proposal that all the lawyers in Washington should turn over the preparation of their cases to a central organization.

FISHER: But how, then, do you propose to get unified intelligence?

McCORMACK: I would propose to get it by using the existing resources of all the government departments -- by a system that will encourage the research and intelligence organizations of the Government to do their best job possible in their own fields and to make the results freely available to one another.

FISHER: You'd

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FISHER: You'd have a sort of coordinating agency, Colonel?

McCORMACK: Let's steer clear of that word "coordinate,"

Mr. Fisher, or Bill here may throw the old gag at me, about a "boordinator to coordinate the coordinators."

That concept of a "coordinating agency" is based on the mistaken idea that all you have to do is set the facts to flowing like water through a pipe, and then sit around and coordinate them. Actually, it's not that easy.

FISHER: But you're against creating one central agency even to process all intelligence.

McCORMACK: I'm against the idea that you have one place into which all information flows, yes. To me that seems impracticable. In the first place, you would have to have a perfectly enormous organization; and second, you cannot and should not remove the intelligence operation from the agencies where day to day policy decisions have to be made.

FISHER: How would you handle it, then?

McCORMACK: I would set up a mechanism to make sure that anyone in the government who needs intelligence, gets it. The nature of this business is such that everybody is everybody else's customer. I want to see that intelligence flows easily from one department to another. I think the collection and basic analysis in each field of intelligence should be assigned to the agency having the primary responsibility in that field. But it should collect and analyze the information in that field required by all other agencies and should make it available to all agencies that have need for it. Once an intelligence agency becomes aware of the fact that it has another agency as a customer, it generally does a good job of tailoring its work to the needs of that customer.

BENTON: That's

BENTON: That's the job that most needs doing -- defining the market for intelligence within the government. And let's hope the government will use the information -- with a lot of common sense!

McCORMACK: Take weather intelligence. Very few people realize how important that is. The job of getting the information rests with the Weather Bureau and, especially in wartime, with the Army Air Forces and the Navy. But the customers for weather intelligence include the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Maritime Commission, various agencies in the Department of Commerce, shipping and air transport companies, and, in fact, every agency engaged in foreign operations.

BENTON: I think, Sterling, that you might ask Colonel McCormack about the Department's specific proposals.

FISHER: By all means. Exactly what kind of organization do you propose, Colonel?

McCORMACK: We propose to create a National Intelligence Authority, presided over by the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, with the Secretary of State as Chairman. The heads of other departments and agencies would be brought in when problems that concern them are up for discussion, but the State, War and Navy Secretaries would be permanent members.

FISHER: That sounds like a centralized agency to me.

McCORMACK: We do propose to unify and centralize the planning of intelligence work in the government, and the job of seeing to it that the plans are carried out. But not by setting up a large and expensive agency on top of those that are already operating.

BENTON: In other words, the plan is to harness all intelligence resources in the government by getting more effective cooperation among departments.

McCORMACK: That's

McCORMACK: That's right. And by making sure that every field of intelligence is being covered by the agency best able to do the job.

FISHER: Colonel McCormack, who would actually run the Authority? The Secretary of State would surely be too busy to give it much of his time.

McCORMACK: There would be a director or executive secretary, with a full-time staff drawn from the interested departments, who would be responsible for the preparation and execution of the intelligence program.

FISHER: From what you say about the range of subjects that foreign intelligence covers, your executive and his staff will have a big job.

McCORMACK: They would -- too big a job to be done by a single Staff. We therefore propose to set up interdepartmental working committees for each of the principal fields of intelligence -- political intelligence, military, economic, geographic, scientific and technological, sociological, etc. In each case the department of primary interest would furnish a full-time chairman and any necessary staff. The job of each committee would be to plan the intelligence program in its own field on a government-wide basis; to allocate responsibilities for the work among the agencies best able to do the work; to insure that the results are available to all who need them; and to provide a continuous mechanism for reviewing the state of our intelligence on any subject, and for recommending means for improving it. It would be the job of the Executive Secretary and his staff, to review the work of these committees and bring it together, so as to insure that the Government's program covers the whole field of foreign intelligence, and that every participating agency is doing the job assigned to it.

FISHER: Let's

FISHER: Let's take the sociological committee. Who would be represented on that?

McCORMACK: The State, War and Navy Departments, as well as several others -- say Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, the Federal Security Agency, possibly others.

FISHER: And what sort of intelligence would the sociological committee be interested in? The study of groups in foreign countries?

McCORMACK: Yes, and various other types of practical knowledge. Such measurable facts as population, size and rate of growth, birth and death rates, racial characteristics, military manpower, migration, education, health and living standards, family structure, and many other things.

FISHER: Colonel McCormack, wouldn't there also be some types of intelligence operations designed to protect us from foreign spies and saboteurs?

McCORMACK: Yes, that is called security intelligence, and there would be similar arrangements for it. Take the matter of controlling the movement of aliens in and out of the country. Here several departments are involved. State is concerned with passport control and visas; FBI with keeping subversive aliens out of the country; Treasury with violations of the customs and revenue laws. The Intelligence Authority would provide machinery for all those agencies to cooperate in planning their intelligence jobs.

BENTON: I think we should make this clear, Al: The proposed Authority will be concerned only with foreign intelligence -- that is, those aspects affecting our relations with other nations. It will steer clear of domestic matters.

McCORMACK: That's right, Bill. It will have nothing to do with policing, or law enforcement -- and that's as it should be, because a foreign national intelligence organization has no business meddling in our domestic affairs.

FISHER: It

FISHER: Now, Colonel McCormack, would this proposed National Intelligence Authority have any operations of its own?

McCORMACK: It might. There are some service functions that can be performed by one agency on behalf of everybody, serving many departments. The Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, for example, which listens to foreign radio broadcasts. That is a very important source of information about the Governments and people of other countries -- about what they are doing and thinking. It yields information that can be obtained in no other way, and you get the information without delay.

FISHER: I understand the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service nearly expired about two weeks ago, Colonel, for lack of funds.

McCORMACK: It was a close call. We almost lost one of our most valuable intelligence agencies. The State Department didn't have funds to take it over, but G-2 -- Military Intelligence -- has arranged to carry it until June 30. After that, perhaps the National Intelligence Authority -- or the State Department -- may be able to take it over.

BENTON: We need those reports on foreign radio for use in our own broadcasting. They are indispensable. And I'm sure Military Intelligence appreciates the importance of radio monitoring after the experience of the war.

McCORMACK: Yes, Bill, during the war it gave the answer to many an intelligence puzzle, sometimes in a wholly unexpected way. For instance: Early this year we were trying hard to find out where the Japs had hidden their tetra-ethyl lead plants -- their source of ethyl fluid for aviation gasoline. To make that product you need sodium and lead -- the two essential ingredients. Well, the boys in G-2 spotted a Jap radio announcement that the  
Emperor



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Emperor had decorated a number of scientists for their war work. There were two chemists on the list who lived in the same town -- the small and not very important city of Koriyama. And here was the clue: One chemist worked for the Nippon Soda Company, the other for the Mitsubishi Lead Company. So Koriyama could be producing sodium and lead, and if so, the odds were that it produced ethyl fluid. General LeMay sent his boys up to take pictures; the oil experts studied them; and there was the ethyl plant, big as life. But not for long. It was rubble and ashes after one visit from the B-29's. But it would be standing today if we had missed the clue in the broadcast.

FISHER: That's a striking example of war intelligence. ...

But to come back to the problem of unifying our intelligence work: Colonel McCormack, where would your Research and Intelligence Office in the State Department fit into the picture?

McCORMACK: It will fill a long-felt need for such services in the Department. In doing so, it will use its own sources of information as well as the intelligence reports of other agencies. We couldn't possibly have a staff large enough to do the whole job ourselves. We must rely on the Army, Navy, Agriculture, Commerce and other agencies for much of the information we need.

FISHER: Do the Army and Navy intelligence reports come to the State Department automatically, or do you have to ask for them?

McCORMACK: Most of them are all channeled to us. But we don't pretend to be a clearing house for all intelligence. We get only such reports as we can use, on a regular basis. Under the proposed intelligence authority, the State Department will be represented on most of the working

working committees, since its interests are so wide. So it will be in close touch with everything that goes on in the intelligence field.

BENTON: Of course, there are precedents for this. An inter-departmental committee on intelligence -- the Joint Intelligence Committee -- was set up during the war.

McCORMACK: Yes, and it worked well, Bill, as far as it went. It was, however, an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, designed to serve their particular needs. It was not intended -- and it did not attempt -- to do a complete intelligence job on a Government-wide basis.

FISHER: Hasn't the State Department had some differences of opinion with the Army and Navy intelligence people, Colonel, where it came to defining the scope of the proposed new authority?

McCORMACK: I wouldn't put it that way, Mr. Fisher. The subject is complicated, and naturally there are different views -- not only among the departments but within each one -- as to the machinery that will work best. The Secretary of State, as directed by the President, proposed a plan. Later he modified it in a number of respects to meet the views of the Army and Navy. The modifications didn't hurt it; I think they improved it. One or two points are still under discussion, but I hope that complete agreement will soon be reached, and that the final result will be the best thought of three Departments. If it is, the plan will have good promise of success. The important thing -- and this I stress -- is that the departments are agreed on the objectives and are working hard to find the best answer for the government as a whole.

FISHER: Now,

FISHER: Now, Mr. McCormack, how much is all this going to cost? That's a question the House Appropriations Committee will ask you.

McCORMACK: Well, Mr. Fisher, that is a very searching question.

I would like to answer it in two parts: How much can we afford to pay for good intelligence, and how much we are now planning to spend,

As to the first question, suppose that during the 1930's the democratic powers had really understood the capabilities of Hitler's Germany and that we had all armed ourselves, and shaped our foreign policies, to prevent the course of action that led to war. How much could we have afforded to pay for intelligence which would have averted the war? Well, if we had spent 50 billion dollars on it, it would have been dirt cheap.

So, I say that this country can afford to spend for good foreign intelligence a great deal more money than good intelligence will ever cost.

As for the more practical question -- how much we are planning to spend -- the State Department's intelligence program for the next fiscal year calls for about 6 million dollars. Maybe that is too little, and if it is, we shall go to the Congress and ask for more. But for the time being we are proposing to plan the work on a long-range basis, to start on a modest scale, and to make the fullest use of the Government's existing resources for intelligence work.

BENTON: Six million dollars per year sounds like a modest sum to me, when you consider that a major war costs more than that per hour.

FISHER: To summarize what you have said, then, we stand in

need of a good, efficient, unified intelligence service.

It won't all be like the war-time operations of the cloak and dagger boys; for the most part it will be much less romantic. But it will be none the less difficult, and

it

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it will be important because it will furnish the basis not only for our outgoing information program, but also for making decisions on our foreign policy. Colonel McCormack, you don't favor putting all government intelligence into one big agency. Instead, you advocate a national intelligence authority which will harness the vast intelligence resources of this government in a cooperative program -- a program designed to assist this nation as a leader in world affairs.

McCORMACK: That's right, Mr. Fisher. We don't want a new agency; we want to improve the work of existing agencies, and see that the intelligence they get is accurate, timely and relevant.

BENTON: ...And is made available to the general public as well as the government, in order to improve understanding among nations. This will help to bring the conscience and the common sense of the average citizen into the making of our foreign policy.

McCORMACK: Mr. Fisher, you know the old saw about the three kinds of intelligence -- human, military and divine. Well, we can't expect to approach the divine level, but we can harness human and military intelligence for the high purposes of national security and international peace.

FISHER: Well, thank you Colonel, and thank you, Mr. Secretary, for bringing us this interesting forecast of our post-war intelligence service.

ANNOUNCER: That was Sterling Fisher of NBC's University of the Air. He has been interviewing Assistant Secretary of State William Benton and Colonel Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of Research and Intelligence, on the question of a unified intelligence service. The discussion was adapted for radio by Selden Menefee.

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Next week we shall present the third of this new group of State Department broadcasts. Assistant Secretary of State Donald Russell, who is responsible for administration in the Department, and Mr. Selden Chapin, Director of the Foreign Service, will discuss the postwar plans of the United States Foreign Service.

This has been the 45th in a series entitled OUR FOREIGN POLICY, presented as a public service by the NBC University of the Air and broadcast to our servicemen and women, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities of the Armed Forces Radio Service. You can obtain printed copies of these broadcasts at ten cents each in coin. If you would like to receive copies of thirteen consecutive reprints, send one dollar to cover the cost of printing and mailing. Address your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. (Let me repeat that address for those of you who wish to write it down: send your order to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. Ten cents in coin for one broadcast, one dollar for a series of thirteen broadcasts. Special rates are available for large orders.) NBC also invites your questions and comments.

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